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THE ILLUSORY RIGHTS OF MARVIN v. MARVIN FOR THE SAME-
SEX COUPLE VERSUS THE PREFERABLE CANADIAN
ALTERNATIVE - M. v. H.
Sharmila Roy Grossman'
INTRODUCTION
It has been my good fortune to know and befriend an individual named
Charlie. He lives in California and is thirty-five years old. At the age of
twenty-four, he acquired a very lucrative job doing exactly what he loved,
writing. He excelled, writing several published pieces while his salary
climbed quickly. At the age of twenty-eight, he shocked those who knew
him when he left his dream job and moved to Sacramento, California. Char-
lie had been in a non-marital, monogamous relationship for seven years with
Gregg. Gregg had the opportunity of a lifetime to form a partnership and be-
gin his own firm in Sacramento, California, requiring him to move. Charlie
moved with Gregg, without hesitation. When Charlie left San Diego, he had
almost $75,000 saved.
After moving, the couple decided that the only way this amazing oppor-
tunity would really work is if Charlie "temporarily" sacrificed employment
as a journalist to help get the new business off the ground. Charlie did so,
again, without hesitation. This arrangement, however, was not so temporary
and continued for several years. During this time, Gregg earned all the in-
come and Charlie became instrumental in running the firm's office. Sud-
denly, Charlie's partner of fourteen years, asked him to leave their home and
never come back. Gregg and Charlie had agreed, when they moved, that
Gregg would financially provide for all of Charlie's needs. Because Gregg
had asked Charlie to basically give up his career, Gregg also agreed to take
care of Charlie if their relationship ended. When they made the agreement,
they were both completely secure their relationship would never end.
The title to their home was in Gregg's name. Charlie did not have any
legal interest in the general partnership. The $75,000 Charlie had in the
bank, when he first moved to Sacramento with Gregg, was invested in
" J.D. Candidate, April 2002, California Western School of Law; B.A., Psychology, San
Diego State University, 1999. I would like to thank my husband Darren A. Grossman for his
support and those times when he protected me from all the world, and sometimes myself, dur-
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Gregg's firm over the seven years in Sacramento-without any agreement or
expectation of repayment.
Charlie came home to San Diego. He now lives in a small studio apart-
ment that he can barely afford, by writing for a community newspaper with a
circulation fewer than 2,000. Meanwhile, Gregg lives in a very large home
with a new lover and a net annual income of over $300,000. Charlie con-
sulted an attorney only to learn that the current law might help, but it would
be an expensive endeavor and there could be little chance of success.
Why should this be the case? Charlie has invested time, money, and
given up a career to support and nurture Gregg, and other non-married cou-
ples are entitled to a remedy in these situations. The attorney Charlie con-
sulted explained that judges are unique individuals and as such, each has
their own unique interpretation of legal precedent. The real answer to this
question is that Charlie is homosexual, and his same-sex relationship is still
unaccepted by society. Somehow this means that Charlie's legal injuries are
less than what a heterosexual would suffer in the exact same scenario.
Charlie's case would be more legally viable if he had invested fourteen
years of his life and his career in a relationship with a woman. Homosexual-
ity has sweeping legal effect on any claim Charlie would bring in regard to
his romantic relationship. Homosexuals are denied basic rights far beyond
equitable division of property: Charlie would not be able to bring a wrongful
death suit for his homosexual partner;' Charlie is not legally entitled to any
employer benefits offered through his homosexual partner's company; Char-
lie has no right to participate in any medical decision of his partner; and the
list continues.
This Comment centers on Marvin v. Marvin,' a case that some have ar-
gued confers property rights on homosexual couples. The discussion specifi-
cally focuses on the linguistic and semantic choices made by the California
Supreme Court when fashioning the Marvin opinion and the implications
and consequences there from.
It should not be forgotten that homosexuals are denied a multitude of
other human rights that heterosexuals are privileged to enjoy and that homo-
sexuals suffer unequal protection under the laws. Unfortunately these other
forms of discrimination that same-sex couples endure are beyond the scope
of this Comment. For now, this Comment centers on the property rights of
an American citizen, who happens to be homosexual, after the dissolution of
a cohabiting relationship.
The first section of this Comment discusses the Marvin decision and
how it theoretically could apply to the same-sex couple. The second section
discusses the actual judicial treatment of Marvin and subsequent courts'
1. Bui see Smith v. Knoller, 19 SCV 319532 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2001) (very recently there
was a shift in the trend of denying homosexuals the same rights as heterosexuals when a Cali-
fornia court allowed a wrongful death cause of action to go forward, which was brought by a
homosexual partner of the deceased).
2. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
[Vol. 38
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utilization of Marvin's language for resolving homosexual cohabitors' prop-
erty disputes. The final section will explore a more effective judicial opinion
recently decided in Ontario, Canada, to divide property between same-sex
couples after cohabitation.
I. MARVIN v. MARVIN
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was an 800% increase in the number
of adults opting to cohabit rather than marry? This major shift in society cre-
ated problems regarding property rights when death or separation occurred.
The California Supreme Court addressed this problem in Marvin v. Marvin."
The issue of property rights after a period of cohabitation, however, is more
severe for same-sex couples that cohabit. This is due to the legal status, or
lack thereof, that same-sex couples endure in this country. Property rights
are a central issue in the ongoing debate over what rights homosexuals
should be afforded. Because homosexuals are prohibited from marrying,
they are forced into cohabitation when involved in monogamous relation-
ships. Many states now view Marvin as the seminal case establishing cohabi-
tor property rights in the United States.5
A. Facts of the Marvin Case
Lee and Michelle Marvin began living together in October of 1964 as
non-marital partners.6 At that time Michelle and Lee entered into an oral
contract in which they agreed that they would combine their efforts and
earnings and would share all property equally.7 They also agreed to hold
themselves out to the public as husband and wife, and further agreed that
Michelle would forego her career as an entertainer in order to be Lee's com-
panion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook.! In return, Lee promised to
financially support Michelle and fulfill her needs for the rest of her life.' In
1970, six years after the relationship began, Lee insisted that Michelle leave
"his" home."0 He continued to meet Michelle's needs until November of the
next year, when he stopped providing support, and Michelle sued for breach
3. It at 110 n.1. Today there are more than four million same-sex couples living in
America, which means roughly 10% of Americans are homosexual. Dominick Vetri, Almost
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lesbians and Gay Men, Their Families and
the Law, 26 S.U. L. REy. 1, 20 (1998).
4. See id
5. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Les-
bian Families, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 1299, 1340 (1997). See Lisa R. Zimmer, Family, Mar-
riage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 681 (1990).
6. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id
10. Id.
3
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of their oral contract." The trial court granted Lee's motion for summary
judgment stating that the 1964 agreement was made when Lee was still mar-
ried and such an "agreement violated public policy because it derogated the
community property rights of Betty Marvin, defendant's lawful wife."'"
B. The Court's Opinion
The California Supreme Court reviewed cohabitation agreements prior
to Marvin.3 Specifically, one case held "[i]f a man and woman [who are not
married] live together as husband and wife under an agreement to pool their
earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations, equity will protect
the interests of each in such property."'" As prior courts have, the Marvin
Court also enforces the agreement entered into by the cohabiting parties, but
not in entirely the same fashion. Marvin contains significant differences. The
Marvin Court ruled:
[T]he courts should enforce express contracts between nonvarital [sic]
partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the
consideration of meretricious 5 sexual services. [ ]In the absence of an ex-
press contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to
determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract ... or
some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also
employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies .. when
warranted by the facts of the case. 6
The first major difference between the Marvin decision and previous
holdings is the Court's deliberate use of gender-neutral language. The opin-
ion makes no reference to "man and woman" as did previous cases. Instead,
the Marvin Court employed the term "nonmarital partners" to describe co-
habitors.1 This gender-neutral language is the reason that many strongly be-
lieve the Marvin decision applies to homosexual, as well as heterosexual,
cohabitors. Indeed there are cases that have applied the Marvin precedent to
11. Id.
12. Id. at 111 n.3. Michelle requested to amend her complaint to reflect that the agree-
ment was reaffirmed after the divorce was final in January of 1967. The trial court, however,
did not allow her leave to amend. This fact makes it more than likely that the trial court'sjudgment was based on an alternative rationale other than Betty Marvin's community prop-
erty rights. Id.
13. Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761 (Cal. 1943).
14. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
15. This term is defined as "[o]f the nature of unlawful sexual connection." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion on the alternative meaning of meretri-
cious, see infra note 32.
16. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
17. Id. at 112.
18. WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE FAMILY
LAw, 20:147 (The Rutter Group 2001); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried
Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family", 29 J. FAM. L.
497, Part VI (1990/1991); Christensen, supra note 5, at 1341.
550 [Vol. 38
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same-sex couples.19 Some scholars have lauded Marvin for establishing long
awaited quasi-marital property rights for homosexuals (as opposed to quasi-
marital status)." Those strongly opposed to same-sex marriage criticize the
case.' Overall there seems to be some agreement among both supporting and
opposing commentators that Marvin may be appllied to same-sex couples.
The second major difference between the Marvin decision and the pre-
Marvin cases is that for the first time, the Court clearly held that homemak-
ing services are adequate consideration for a cohabitation agreement.' While
the court states that homemaking services are valid consideration, however,
it reiterates that mere sexual services are not to be considered adequate con-
sideration.' The opinion goes on to clarify that parties cannot contract for
payment of sexual acts because this amounts to an illegal contract for
prostitution. '
The court, likely anticipating a defendant's argument, adds a caveat:
"The fact that a man and a woman live together without marriage, and en-
gage in a sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements be-
tween them relating to their earnings, property, or expenses." ' In other
words, the consideration for a promise of financial support and sharing of
property cannot be a promise of sexual services, but the fact that the cohabit-
ing adults have sexual relations does not make their cohabitation agreement
illegal and thereby unenforceable when there are other forms of considera-
tion present. The agreement would be unenforceable only if it rests entirely
upon consideration for meretricious sexual services.' The court applied the
traditional contract principle of severability in making this point. This prin-
ciple states that if parts of the contractual consideration are illegal, any sev-
erable portion of the contract, which is supported by independent legal con-
sideration, will still be enforced. '
The third major departure from pre-Marvin cases is the type of agree-
ments entered into by non-marital cohabiting partners that the Court was
willing to enforce. The court stretches previous case law so that more co-
habitation agreements are deemed enforceable. Pre-Marvin case law prohib-
ited recovery for breach of an express cohabitation contract if the contracting
19. See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B. These cases will be discussed in detail.
20. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 50 HAT MGs L.J. 1015, 1123-24 (1999). See Melton, supra note
18.
21. See generally Lynn Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-
Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (1996).
22. Marvin, 557 P.2dat 113 n.5.
23. Id. at 116.
24. Id.
25. d at 113.
26. Id. The court acknowledges that almost every agreement between non-marital part-
ners who are cohabiting will involve a mutual sexual relationship. Therefore, this should not
be the standard for measuring a valid cohabitation agreement. See id. at 114.
27. Id. at 114.
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parties were not a man and a woman.28 The Marvin Court leaves out the
terms man and woman, suggesting the sex of the contracting parties has no
effect on enforceability. Additionally, after Marvin, legal credence is also
given to implied contracts, because a court may inquire into the actions or
conduct of the cohabitants to determine if an implied contract exists. 9 The
Court goes even further and provides dicta stating that a nonmarital partner
may recover under the doctrine of quantum meruit for the reasonable value
of the services rendered.3" The Court's liberal construing of these agreements
suggests its willingness to adapt to changing social mores. Its liberal attitude,
however, is questionable towards the end of the Court's opinion.
C. Marvin's Potential Application to Same-Sex Couples
Throughout the Marvin opinion the Court takes great pains to use gen-
der-neutral language. One can only guess why this deliberate language was
used, because the court never states outright the reason it chose to use terms
such as "nonmarital partner" and "nonmarital relationships." This poses a
problem for same-sex couples. Most legal analysts have concluded that the
Court intended its decision to apply to same-sex couples as well as hetero-
sexual couples.' The fact that the Court has not stated such an intention ex-
pressly has, in effect, created a barrier in the case law rather than a right for
same-sex partners reflecting the changes in society as the court claimed it in-
tended to do.32
The Court's silence, as to what type of non-marital relationships Marvin
will apply, is observed by Justice Clark in Marvin's dissenting opinion: "the
majority fails to advise us of the circumstances permitting recovery, limita-
tions on recovery, or whether their numerous remedies are cumulative or ex-
clusive."33 The Court might have intended to open the door for homosexual
property rights, but it provided the opportunity to slam it shut in the future
28. See Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (Cal. 1943).
29. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122. The terms "express" and "implied" do not pertain to
whether the agreement was oral or in writing, but instead they reflect whether the agreement
is shown by direct words of the parties (either spoken or written), which is considered an ex-
press contract, or whether the agreement is shown through the conduct or actions of the par-
ties, which is considered an implied contract. Id. at 110.
30. Id. at 122.
31. HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 18, 20:147.
32. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122. There is yet further language in the Marvin opinion that
could indicate the Court may not have truly intended its decision to apply to homosexual co-
habitants. The Court holds that agreements between cohabiting adults regarding the distribu-
tion of property acquired during the relationship shall be given legal credence except in the
case that such agreement rests explicitly on the consideration of meretricious sexual services.
Id. at 110. The term meretricious has different interpretations and could indicate something of
an unlawful sexual nature or involving two people of the same sex. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 412 (pocket ed. 1996). If the court used "meretricious" in the latter sense, then it
is clear that they did not intend to enforce cohabitation agreements between same-sex couples.
33. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38
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by not expressly holding that the law must apply to all cohabitants, regard-
less of gender.
Marvin's majority opinion provides further language to build an argu-
ment that it does not apply to homosexual couples. In a footnote, the court
adds,
Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable reme-
dies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship
in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of
such remedies may be determined in later cases in light of the factual set-
ting in which they arise.
4
Allowing a homosexual plaintiff to recover a portion of the property ac-
quired during same-sex cohabitation can be easily construed as an evolution
of equitable remedies, which some courts could find unsuitable. The lan-
guage in Marvin (emphasized above) allows future courts too much leeway
and thereby makes it easier for those courts to deny recovery to a homosex-
ual plaintiff by deeming the remedy "unsuitable." It is apparent at the begin-
ning of footnote twenty-five that the Court is attempting to construct a hold-
ing that applies to all cohabitation agreements; however, the Court's
"suitability" clause created a rule that resembles a swaying building that
could easily collapse on itself at anytime.
II. SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF MARVIN AS APPLIED TO SAME-
SEX COUPLES
Although the holding of Marvin contains gender neutral language,
thereby suggesting that its rule could extend to same-sex relationships, the
judicial treatment of Marvin v. Marvin indicates the judiciary's unwilling-
ness to grant property rights to cohabiting homosexuals. There are two cases
directly on point in California, which seriously impact the application of
Marvin to same-sex cohabitants: Jones v. Daly and Whorton v. Dillingham.
A. Jones v. Daly"
Randall Jones began cohabiting with James Daly in March of 1976.
Jones and Daly agreed they would combine their efforts and earnings, share
all property equally regardless of who had title, and hold themselves out to
the public as cohabiting mates.36 In addition, they agreed Daly would pay
Jones an allowance for his personal use, and in return, Jones would "render
his services as a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion,
housekeeper and cook to Daly."3 The couple cohabited until Daly's death.
34. Il at 123 n.25 (emphasis added).
35. 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
36. Id. at 131.
37. I
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At the time of his death, Daly had substantial real and personal property,
which was acquired during the cohabitation and "value[d] in excess of two
million dollars."38 Daly's executors took possession of the property. Jones
filed suit claiming that under their oral cohabitors agreement, all of the "co-
habitors equitable property" was to be divided equally between himself and
Daly.3' The defendants demurred, stating "the 'cohabitors agreement' is [sic]
unenforceable because the complaint show[ed] on its face that plaintiff's
rendition of sexual services to Daly was an express and inseparable part of
the consideration for the agreement."' The trial court sustained the defen-
dant's demurrer. This Court of Appeal upheld the decision, inferring that the
word "lover" used in the pleading referred to sexual acts that formed "an in-
separable part of the consideration for the [] agreement.""'
This case teaches us more about how to create a technically proper
pleading for a Marvin action than it does about the relevant substantive law
regarding cohabitation agreements. The Jones Court reached its decision
based on a minor technicality and shaky inferences regarding sexual acts be-
tween homosexual men. Essentially, the Jones Court has created a rule that a
plaintiff, especially a homosexual one, should not include words such as
"sex" or "lover" or other similar words when filing a Marvin action. Jones
effectively narrowed the Marvin decision, and by extension, homosexuals'
rights to contract with one another regarding the disposition of their real and
personal property. '
More importantly, Jones provides additional strength to the elusive bar-
rier already present in Marvin, preventing enforcement of cohabitor agree-
ments between same-sex couples. After Jones, it is easier to show that the
implied or express contract was illegal (i.e. invalid) and therefore unenforce-
able by merely alleging in the complaint that the parties engaged in sexual
activity with one another, despite many other forms of valid consideration.
This was not the "intention" of the Marvin court, at least when contemplat-
ing heterosexual cohabitants. This twisted application of precedent is strong
evidence of judicial distaste for homosexuality. The justices in Marvin noted
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 132. The defendants based their demurrer on the Marvin holding, which pre-
vents recovery for breach of a cohabitation agreement if illegal consideration, such as mere-
tricious sexual services, is inseparable from legal consideration. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 112 (Cal. 1976).
41. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The Court noted among other things that the plaintiff
and Daly engaged in sexual activity during their relationship and acted as two people would
who had "discovered love" and the Court considered this to be sufficient evidence that sexual
services was the predominant consideration of their cohabiters agreement. Id.
42. See Zimmer, supra note 5, at 697. Zimmer states, "[tihe primary drawback to the
contract alternative is that same-sex couples must eliminate any reference to their sexual rela-
tionship from the document. Courts read admission of sexual intimacy in written documents
as consideration for the agreement rendering such cohabitation agreements unenforceable."
Id. This current judicial sensitivity to the mention of a sexual relationship, among a laundry
list of other valid and legal consideration, is a direct result of the Jones decision.
[Vol. 38
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that many cohabiting adults would have sexual relations that were incident
to cohabitation itself.'3 The Court did not hold that such relations automati-
cally created an unenforceable contract." The language used in Marvin
makes this clear: "even if sexual services are part of the contractual consid-
eration, any Severable [sic] portion of the contract supported by independent
consideration will still be enforced." '
The Jones decision defied yet another part of the Marvin holding.
Marvin expressly held that homemaking services are valuable and lawful
consideration, severable from the sexual relationship. ' The Jones Court
never addressed or applied this part of Marvin. Instead Jones' homemaking
services were given no weight because of an inference made in the pleading
regarding the possible existence of a sexual relationship. '
There will always be difficulty trying to explain the value of what a per-
son does everyday inside his or her home as a partner or companion of an-
other. The Jones decision limits how a plaintiff may show legal considera-
tion-making a list of daily chores, leaving out any mention of love,
emotional support, or intimacy. In reality, chores are probably the smallest
and least valuable portion of the consideration a person actually furnishes in
an agreement to be someone's life partner. This valuation has never been
easy to make, regardless of sexual orientation, and the Jones decision makes
it even more difficult.
The Jones decision was fundamentally incorrect because the Court did
not take the broader view nor give value to all the different forms of consid-
eration offered in the agreement. Instead, the Court focused on the word
"lover" and had to extrapolate on this word in order to dismiss the case. The
Court had to make a significant leap to hold that the word "lover" was equal
to the phrase "meretricious sexual services." The plaintiff listed other forms
of consideration that the Marvin Court expressly held were separable and le-
gal consideration. ' The Court could have easily found the other forms of
consideration to be separable, thus finding valid consideration for Daly's
promise to always financially care for Jones. 9
The Jones decision has received similar criticism from the California
Court of Appeal in Bergen v. Wood." In Bergen, the Court held that Jones
was wrongly decided because Marvin plainly states that homemaking ser-
vices are lawful consideration for a cohabitation agreement.5' The Bergen
43. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114.
44. L
45. Id
46. Id at 113.
47. Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1981).
48. Id. at 131 (Mr. Jones listed companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook as other
forms of consideration).
49. Id.
50. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75 (Ct. App. 1993).
51. Id at 859.
9
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court notes that Michelle Marvin, in Marvin v. Marvin, was able to establish
legal consideration for her services as a homemaker, housekeeper, and cook
and these were some of the same services Jones provided Daly."
The Bergen case applies Marvin principles correctly and offers a good
example of those services that cannot truly be separated from the sexual rela-
tionship. In Bergen, Wood began a relationship with Bergen, a German ac-
tress he met in Monte Carlo." The couple never cohabited, but still made an
agreement regarding their relationship. They agreed that Wood would supply
Bergen with money and pay for travel expenses and hotel accommodations,
while Bergen agreed to be Wood's companion, confidante, homemaker, and
social hostess."4 When the relationship ended seven years later, Bergen sued
for violation of the oral agreement that Wood would provide her financial
support. The Court held cohabitation was a prerequisite and a necessity in
order to meet the Marvin standards. 5 The Bergen Court specifically held that
"[c]ohabitation is necessary not in and of itself, but rather, because from co-
habitation flows the rendition of domestic services, which services amount
to lawful consideration for a contract between the parties."' 6 In other words,
without cohabitation there could be no homemaking services to serve as law-
ful consideration as contemplated by the Marvin court. The only services
Bergen supplied to Wood were that of a "social companion" and "hostess."
These services are not the types that are normally compensated or separable
from the sexual relationship, which in reality seemed to be the basis of the
relationship.' Bergen provides a perfect example of services so closely inter-
twined with the sexual relationship that compensation for such would be il-
legal and consequently the Marvin rule was not meant to apply.
The Bergen Court's application of Marvin principles is starkly con-
trasted to the application of Marvin in the Jones case. The Jones Court en-
tirely disregarded the distinction made in Marvin, regarding which services
were separable and could be considered legal consideration. This resulted in
a narrowing of the Marvin decision and a distortion of same-sex couples'
right to enter into cohabitation agreements under Marvin precedent, enforc-
ing yet another difference between the treatment of homosexuals and hetero-
sexuals under the law. 8
52. Id.
53. Id. at 76.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 77. The court also pointed out that if cohabitation were not required, then po-
tentially every person that an individual dated, even if only one date had occurred, would be
able to bring a Marvin action for promises made regarding property or finances. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 79.
58. It should be noted that Jones v. Daly, decided in 198 1, was the first case to apply the
rule set out in Marvin to same-sex cohabitants. While this was an important and positive as-
pect of the Jones case, it still does more harm than good when it comes to the rights of homo-
sexuals and cohabitors in general. For example, Jones clearly established that the mention of a
sexual relationship would render all other consideration inseparable. This appears to be why
[Vol. 38
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B. Whorton v. Dillingham"
Whorton is another case example that supports the idea that the Marvin
court may not have intended its opinion to apply to same-sex couples. The
effect that Jones v. Daly has had on the Marvin analysis can be directly ob-
served in the Whorton case. The plaintiff, Donnis Whorton, brought suit for
breach of an express' cohabitation agreement between him and his same-sex
partner, Benjamin Dillingham."' Whorton stopped attending school in order
to work full-time as the defendant's chauffeur, bodyguard, social and busi-
ness secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments, and personal
representative.' Whorton was incidentally Dillingham's lover, companion,
and confidante.' In return for Whorton's consideration, the defendant prom-
ised to give Whorton half the equity interest in all the real estate they already
acquired in their joint names and all the property acquired from that point
on, along with a promise to financially support Whorton for the rest of his
life."
The parties also made a more specific agreement that if any part of their
cohabitation agreement was found to be legally unenforceable, then that part
would be severable and the rest of their agreement would be enforced.' This
type of clause was relatively novel and its presence essentially forced the
court to develop a procedure or guideline for identifying and severing
unlawful from lawful consideration as the Marvin precedent instructs the
court to do.' By developing this guideline, the Whorton Court provided ex-
the heterosexual plaintiff in Bergen v. Wood filed a Marvin action and left out all indications
that a sexual relationship was shared between the parties. The sexual relationship was the only
real consideration given for the defendant's promise to be financially responsible for the
plaintiff's trips and lodging when she visited him. The plaintiff used creative language such as
"companion," "confidante," and "social hostess" to describe the sexual nature of the relation-
ship, instead of using words such as "lover" or "sex." See Bergen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75.
59. 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
60. The terms "express" and "implied" do not pertain to whether the agreement was oral
or in writing; instead, they reflect whether the agreement is shown by direct words of the par-
ties (either spoken or written), which is considered an express contract, or if the agreement is
shown through the conduct or actions of the parties, which is considered an implied contract.
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 n.16 (Cal. 1976).
61. Wlorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
62. Id.
63. 1& at 407.
64. Ia&
65. Id. It is likely that the parties had the Marvin holding in mind when making their
agreement and contemplated the complication created by the Jones decision.
66. The Court turned to the Restatement Second of Contracts and used the test found
therein for determining whether a contract that has both lawful and unlawful forms of consid-
eration is enforceable. Id. at 408. The Court held,
[o]ne test for determining the enforceability... [is] "if the parties' performances
can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of part performances so that the parts
of each pair are properly regarded as agreed equivalents and one pair is not offen-
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amples of the types of services that were lawful and compensable considera-
tion in a cohabitation agreement.67 The Whorton holding, however, only on
its face seems to follow the arguable goal of the Marvin Court to have its
holding apply to all cohabitation agreements regardless of gender. In fact,
the Whorton Court's finding that only certain forms of consideration are le-
gal is precisely the means it uses to diverge from the Marvin holding and
consequently narrow its scope.
At one point in the opinion, the Whorton Court seems to diverge from
the Jones analysis when it states, "by itemizing the mutual promises to en-
gage in sexual activity, Whorton has not precluded the trier of fact from
finding those promises are the consideration for each other and independent
of the bargained for consideration . . 8 Whorton, however, ends up com-
mitting the same error that Jones did-ignoring the Marvin precedent by re-
fusing to find the homemaking services legal and severable consideration for
a cohabitation agreement. This error is made apparent by the services that
Whorton actually holds to be legal consideration. The court finds that the
types of services that can be considered valuable and legal consideration are
those that are apart from services normally incident to the state of cohabita-
tion-such as being "a chauffeur, secretary, bodyguard, and [business] part-
ner."' This is directly contrary to the Marvin decision, which specifically
holds that "[a] promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a law-
ful and adequate consideration for a contract.""'3 It is obvious that homemak-
ing services are normally incident to the state of cohabitation. The Whorton
Court disregards Marvin and assists Jones in narrowing the precedent by re-
fusing to apply major and significant portions of the Marvin holding to
same-sex couples.
These few but significant Marvin actions, involving homosexual cohabi-
tors, have set the tone for future courts to follow. One commentator de-
scribed American case law regarding cohabitor property rights as "seething
chaos."7 However, cohabitor property rights, as to homosexuals, are not
sive to public policy, that portion of the agreement is enforceable by a party who
did not engage in serious misconduct.
Id.
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 409-10. Contrasted with the Jones court, which held that because the word
"lover" was used by the plaintiff to describe only one aspect of the consideration given for the
promise of financial support that this constituted "meretricious" sexual services, as contem-
plated by the Marvin court, and this was not severable from all other forms of consideration
listed by the plaintiff, such as homemaking, which was specifically held legal consideration in
Marvin. Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132-33 (Ct. App. 1981).
69. Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
70. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976).
71. JOHN MEE, THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF COHABITEEs: AN ANALYSIS OiF EQUrIY'S
RESPONSE IN FIVE COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 1 (Hart Pub., Ltd. 1999) (quoting Meagher,
Constructive Trusts: High Court Developments and Prospects, 4 AUSTRALIAN BAR REv. 67.
71(1988)).
(Vol. 38
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really in chaos. To the contrary, the case law on point, namely Jones v. Daly
and Whorton v. Dillingham, make the analysis very clear and straightfor-
ward. Based on these cases, when it comes to same-sex couples, the courts
will likely decline to follow Marvin precedent and hold that the sexual rela-
tionship is not severable from homemaking services. Even though the lan-
guage of the Marvin opinion provides courts the opportunity to develop
remedies for homosexual cohabitants, "[the a]ttempts to challenge the dis-
criminatory treatment of same sex couples have, as yet, met with limited
success in the courts." The reason for this is most likely because homosex-
ual cohabitation is still very much unaccepted by American society, just as
heterosexual cohabitation was in the years preceding the Marvin case. Be-
cause of this social disapproval, courts seem more inclined to find homosex-
ual cohabitation agreements unenforceable." This judicial behavior denies
homosexuals the basic human right to choose a mate and create a home.
Therefore it is not easily justified.
As previous commentators on gay rights have noted, refusing to enforce
a cohabitation agreement because of sexual preference, arguably, could qual-
ify as a violation of the constitutional right to privacy." Therefore the state
must have a compelling interest to act in this manner."' The state's interest
would likely be to promote heterosexual sex or even possibly to encourage
homosexuals to marry persons of the opposite sex."6 It would be very diffi-
cult to prove these interests are compelling, and that judicial refusal to en-
force homosexual cohabitation contracts is the means to satisfy this inter-
est.' The first time the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the privacy rights of
homosexuals was in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986.7" Hardwick was charged
for violating anti-sodomy laws in the privacy of his own home, and he chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute, but was unsuccessful.'
There are numerous constitutional arguments against the unequal pro-
tection of homosexuals and deprivation of basic rights. This topic is vast and
important, and it must therefore be noted. Because of its complexity and
72. Id. at 13. While the author was speaking of foreign jurisdictions, this is equally true
for America as is apparent by the case law previously discussed.
73. J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill, A Reconnaissance of Public Policy Restric-
tions Upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Colabitants. 18 FAi. L. Q. 93, 140 n. 162
(1984). The authors support this contention with an analysis of Jones v. Daly.
74. Id. at 135.
75. Id.
76. 1&
77. Id.
78. Patrick J. Dooley, Note, I Am Who I Am, Or Am I? A Comparison of the Equal Pro-
tection of Sexual Minorities in Canadian and U.S. Courts: hnmutability Has Only Found a
Home North of the Border, 17 AR. J. INr'L & CoMP. L. 371, 395 (2000).
79. I. at 395-96. The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not extend a
fundamental privacy right to homosexuals to engage in sodomy and that homosexual sodomy
was not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." ld. (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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numerous issues, however, it goes beyond the scope of this Comment and is
therefore only addressed briefly here."0
The freedom our judicial system enjoys regarding the enforcement of
cohabitation contracts, especially for the same-sex couple, has created an
environment more uncertain and dangerous than it was before the judiciary
ever reviewed the issue. The case law established by Marvin lacks any real
stability and force, which all laws require if they are to be followed. This in-
stability results from the creation of loopholes by the Court because it has
perceived society as unwilling or unprepared to accept homosexuality.' This
method of adjudication provides society a way out and the means to continue
discrimination and exclusion of differences and individuality. The problem
with this method is that it produces stagnation in the law, halts growth of
people and society, and results in a much different America than the one we
live in today. If the beliefs and values of the majority of society were al-
lowed to control at other places and times in our history, women would still
have no voice in American government, our children would attend racially
segregated schools, and those practicing the Wiccan religion would still be
burned at the stake.
It is obvious, after a thorough analysis, that Marvin v. Marvin does not
ensure the rights of homosexual cohabitants and, in conjunction with subse-
quent cases, provides a vehicle for further discrimination both socially and
judicially. All hope is not lost, however, because there is an alternative.
III. THE CANADIAN ALTERNATIVE
A. The Evolution of Canadian Case Law Granting Rights to Same-Sex
Couples
Cohabitation has received social and legal recognition in Canada over
the past three decades.82 Canadian law establishing the rights of non-marital
cohabiting adults has evolved in much the same way as American case law.
The province of Ontario, however, recently surpassed California and the ma-
jority of American states in the area of cohabitor rights, specifically in re-
gard to same-sex cohabitation.83 While the recent Canadian progress con-
80. For a more thorough discussion of the constitutional arguments associated with the
rights of sexual minorities see Dooley, supra note 78; and Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Consti-
tutional Guarantee of Equal Protection in Canada and the United States: A Comparative
Analysis of the Standards for Determining the Validity of Governmental Action, 5 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1997); and Zimmer, supra note 5.
81. See discussion supra Part I.C.
82. Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation
of Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAm. L. 114, 152-53 (2000).
83. A minority of other American states, including Georgia, Oregon and Alaska, have
granted property rights to same-sex cohabitors. Christensen, supra note 5, at 1341-44. States
other than California, which are more likely to enforce same-sex cohabitation agreements and
560 [Vol. 38
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ceming homosexual rights occurred in the province of Ontario, the leader in
this area of law has always been British Colombia." Similar to America's
reaction to homosexual rights and equal treatment for homosexuals, Can-
ada's reaction to homosexual rights and same-sex equality was hesitant.'
This hesitation can be observed when analyzing a number of cases that the
Supreme Court of Canada adjudicated in recent years.
The first time that the Canadian Supreme Court dealt directly with the
rights of same-sex couples was in Egan v. Canada.' Jim Egan and Jack
Nesbit had been partners since 1948, and when they applied for spousal Old
Age Security benefits in 1991, they were denied because they were not of
the opposite sex. The couple sued under section 15 of the Canadian Charter
establish property rights for homosexuals are those where the courts "are willing to engage in
Marvin's 'searching inquiry into the nature of the relationship'" to discover if an agreement
can be implied where no formal agreement exists. ld. at 1343. If a court is willing to imply an
agreement where one does not technically exist in order to award one person's property to a
former unmarried cohabiting partner, then it is more likely that the same court is willing to
enforce a cohabitation agreement between same-sex partners.
Most American jurisdictions are unwilling to enforce same-sex cohabitation agreements.
This is evident by legislation such as DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) essentially prohibit-
ing legal recognition of homosexual relationships. There is no national or state legislation that
grants same-sex couples the benefit of marriage. Deborah M. Henson, A Comparative Analy-
sis of Same-Sex Partnership Protections: Recommendations for American Reform, 7 Lsr'L
J.L. & FAM. 282, 292 (1993). The United States, however, is slowly moving forward in states
such as Vermont, which came close to granting all the benefits of marriage to homosexuals in
the recent decision Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Unfortunately, the national status
of homosexual property rights far exceeds the scope of this paper. This paper is narrowly tai-
lored to the California case establishing same-sex cohabitor property rights, its linguistic limi-
tations, and a more beneficial alternative.
84. Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord, Family Law for Same Sex Couples:
Chartering the Course, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101, 107 (1998) (In 1997, British Colombia
passed the Family Relations Amendment Act and the Family Maintenance Enforcement
Amendment Act which effectively included gays and lesbians in the definition of spouse.
These acts created several new rights and obligations, which only heterosexuals were entitled
to previously, such as custody, access, guardianship, spousal and child support, support en-
forcement, domestic contract enforcement, and lastly possessory right to property.).
85. Canada slowly granted rights to homosexuals in a "piecemeal fashion." Id. at 106. As
homosexuals in Canada legally challenged statutes prohibiting same-sex couples certain bene-
fits conferred on traditional couples, the case law established sporadic rights for homosexuals
such as employer benefits, conjugal visits, refugee status, and human rights protections. Id.
This case law approach is identical to the American solution for unequal treatment based on
sexual orientation. One example is the Marvin decision establishing property rights for homo-
sexual cohabitors. See discussion supra Part I. Another example is the recent decision in San
Francisco by Judge A. James Robertson II, allowing a lesbian partner of a woman mauled to
death by two large dogs earlier this year to bring a wrongful death action. Although the later
case does not have precedential value, it is an example of the "piecemeal fashion" of estab-
lishing rights for homosexuals. Ron Harris, Woman's Lawsuit in Mauling Death of her Part-
nerAllowed to Proceed, SAN DIEGO UNION Tim., July 28, 2001, at A3. available at 2001 WL
6475086.
86. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).
87. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84, at 106.
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of Rights and Freedoms claiming that the denial was a violation of their
equality rights.8
Most Canadian homosexuals, when filing a cause of action for depriva-
tion of fights, do so under section 15.9 This section of the Charter does not,
however, specifically list sexual orientation as a protected class." The Court
in Egan held for the first time that sexual orientation is a ground for dis-
crimination, thereby adding homosexuals to the class of persons protected
by section 15."' What was peculiar about the decision is that even though all
members of the Court agreed that declining benefits based on sexual orienta-
tion was discriminatory, they held, in a 5-4 decision, that this discriminatory
treatment was still constitutional.' The Court based its decision on section 1
of the Charter, which essentially states that rights and freedoms in the char-
ter are subject to society's reasonable limitations.93 This case is a perfect ex-
ample of the Court's refusal to recognize the same-sex relationship, much
like society's slow recognition of the same.
Another case that had an impact on homosexual rights was Miron v.
Trudel.9 ' The plaintiffs in this case were a man and a woman who were liv-
ing in a state of non-marital cohabitation with their children.9' Miron was in-
jured in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. 6 As a result of
88. JOEL BAKAN, JUST WORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS 109
(1997).
89. See McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84. The title of section 15 is "Equality Rights"
and provides: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, with-
out discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 15(1). The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is equivalent to
the American Constitution, but is subject to frequent amendments, which makes it more
analogous to the oft-updated California State Constitution.
90. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 15(1).
91. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84, at 106; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982)
pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 15.(21).
92. BAKAN, supra note 88. While the Court agreed that the plaintiff's rights had been
violated and that homosexuals fall within section 15's protections, it held that the infringe-
ment was saved by section one of the Charter. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84, at 106;
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §
15(21).
93. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84. Section 1 of the Charter provides: "The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), § 1. The Court held that finding same-sex couples fall under the definition of
"spouse" is beyond the reasonable limits of section 1 based on the fact that "sexual orientation
was relevant to fundamental social norms and values". McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84.
Therefore Egan and Nesbit could not collect spousal Old Age Benefits.
94. Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.).
95. Id. at 430.
96. Id.
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the accident, he was no longer able to work and support his family. Miron
made a claim for loss of income and damages against Valliere's (his cohabit-
ing partner's) insurance policy, which extended uninsured motorist benefits
to the "spouse" of the insured. ' The insurance company denied the claim on
the ground that the two were not legally married."' The couple brought suit
for accident benefits under the insurance policy, and the insurance company
brought a motion to determine whether Miron was the "spouse" of Valliere."
The judge held that a "spouse" means a person who is legally married, and
therefore Miron was not the spouse of Valliere." The couple appealed the
decision by way of a section 15 Charter challenge."0 ' The Supreme Court
held that marital status was a ground for discrimination under section 15(l)
and further held that excluding unmarried cohabitants from benefits and
privileges afforded married persons is a violation of the Charter and cannot
be saved by section I." This case essentially holds that a "married require-
ment" is unconstitutional.' 3 Miron established that "the Court was willing to
question whether privileges should be associated with heterosexuality and
marriage" in the first place.'" This was a very important step towards a hold-
ing that would prohibit a "married requirement" between same-sex couples
in order to qualify for benefits married persons are entitled.
The third case that had a major impact on the rights of same-sex couples
was Vriend v. Alberta.'" Vriend was employed at a college in the province of
Alberta.'" Two years into his employment, the president of the college in-
quired into his sexuality, and Vriend disclosed that he was a homosexual.'"
Less than a year later the college instituted a prohibition on homosexuality,
and Vriend was asked to resign. ' When he refused, his employment was
terminated for non-compliance with the college's policy on homosexual
practices.'" Vriend attempted to file a complaint with the Human Rights
Commission of Alberta but was unsuccessful." The Individual Rights Pro-
tection Act (IRPA) did not include sexual orientation as a protected class and
97. Id. For terms of policy, see id. at 432.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 431.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Holland, supra note 82, at 131.
103. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84, at 107.
104. Id. This decision was considered a major victory for heterosexual cohabitants. "The
Supreme Court by a clear majority appeared to equate marriage and opposite-sex cohabita-
tion." Holland, supra note 82, at 133. It should be noted that this decision was not applied to
same-sex cohabitants, nor implied by the court that it should, as was the case in Marvin v.
Marvin. See discussion supra Part I.C.
105. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.).
106. Id. at 494.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id at 495.
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therefore did not permit the filing of a complaint on the grounds that an em-
ployer has discriminated against an individual because of sexual orienta-
tion.' Vriend brought suit under section 15 of the Charter."' The Court held:
The IRPA in its under-inclusive state therefore denies substantive equality
to [homosexuals].... [T]he IRPA creates a distinction which results in the
denial of the equal benefit and protection of the law on the basis of sexual
orientation, a personal characteristic which is analogous to those enumer-
ated in s[ection] 15(1). This, in itself, is sufficient to conclude that dis-
crimination is present and that there is a violation of s[ection] 15." 3
The court remedied the section 15 violation by "reading... into" the
Act sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, even though
it was excluded initially."'
This trilogy of Canadian cases represents an approach similar to the one
California has taken in attempting to grant rights to the same-sex couple-
the case law method."5 The problem with the case law method of conferring
rights on discriminated groups such as homosexuals is the irregular applica-
tion of such case law by several different courts' unique interpretation of
precedent setting cases."6 This method allows judges to insert, whether in-
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.at496-97.
114. Id. at 570. Justice Jacobucci went on to say,
In my opinion, groups that have historically been the target of discrimination can-
not be expected to wait patiently for the protection of their human dignity and
equal rights while governments move toward reform one step at a time. If the in-
fringement of the ights and freedoms of these groups is permitted to persist while
governments fail to pursue equality diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter
will be reduced to little more than empty words.
Id. at 559-60. This statement indicates a change in the court's attitude towards the acceptance
of the presence of same-sex relationships.
115. In California, same-sex couples have not expressly been granted any property fights
by the judiciary, but it is argued that Marvin v. Marvin impliedly grants same-sex couples
property distribution rights. See discussion, supra Part I.B. The California legislature did act
once in an attempt to provide same-sex couples with some rights. The Family Code provides a
cohabiting same-sex couple with the opportunity to register as a domestic partnership (as well
as cohabiting heterosexuals), which would confer a few fights that married individuals enjoy.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.5 (West 2000). The rest of the Family Code does not apply to same-
sex couples with the sole exception of the section on domestic partnership.
116. This problem has been predicted and observed by other analysts. John Mee, Barris-
ter and Lecturer in Law, stated,
Upon reflection, it appears that many of these problems will arise, not as a result of
deficiencies in the relevant equitable doctrines, but rather because of the manner in
which judges may apply them in the context of homosexual cohabitation. The
point is that ... in cases dealing with heterosexual cohabitation, equity has tradi-
tionally refused to make any doctrinal concessions to the reality of the [homosex-
ual] relationships involved.
[Vol. 38
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tentionally or not, their personal beliefs regarding homosexuality when de-
ciding cases regarding same-sex couples."7 The effect of personal beliefs and
values is more extensive when interpreting case law as opposed to legisla-
tion."' This problem is observed in the California cases applying Marvin
case law."9
B. M v. IV" - A Landmark Case
Canada quickly realized the weaknesses of the case law method to es-
tablish rights for same-sex couples. One author has said it best:
The odd thing about the evolution of our law in this area is that we have
proceeded in this incremental fashion without really tackling the issue. We
have recognized the individual human rights of gays and lesbians, and the
rights of same sex couples as spouses for various purposes.... [Tlhere is
still an assumption, which manifests itself in dominant notions of family
and hence our family law, that the "family" is comprised of opposite sex
spouses and the children resulting from sexual intercourse. Gay and les-
bian families are only exceptionally granted recognition in family law.
We've been hedging around the issue, without really getting to the heart of
the matter.'
Only one year after Vriend the Supreme Court decided the most impor-
tant decision to date - M v. H. M and H were a lesbian couple that separated
after a ten year relationship, leaving M without a home, access to her liquid
capital, an opportunity to participate in their joint advertising business, and
income." M filed a claim for spousal support under the Ontario Family Law
Act (FLA).I The motion judge upheld her claim, finding that the words "a
man and a woman" were to be read out of the definition of spouse in
MEF, supra note 71, at 26. The author goes on to explain that "U]udges might subconsciously
(or at least without admitting it) conclude that the law should not get involved in a dispute
arising out of a "questionable" relationship and should (as in cases where the litigants had
both been involved in some illegality) allow property rights to lie where they fall." Id. at 28.
117. "[Jludges might fail to take seriously the level of commitment involved in a homo-
sexual union. This could mean that judges would tend to underestimate the extent of the con-
tributions and sacrifices of a homosexual claimant or would refuse to regard them as having
been undertaken on the basis of the relationship." MEE, supra note 71, at 28 (footnote omit-
ted).
118. This tends to be the case, at least in American jurisdictions, because courts must
obey the published legislative intent of a statute (usually found in the preamble of an Act)
unless the statute is found to be unconstitutional. While it is true that lower courts are also
required to follow the precedent established by higher courts, there is more of an opportunity
to creatively interpret judicial opinions, as opposed to legislation, because the opinions do not
always contain the clear intent of the court, as is the case with Marvin.
119. See discussion supra Part II.
120. M v. H [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
121. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 84, at I11.
122. Mv. H, 2 S.C.R. at4.
123. Id. at 4.
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s[ection] 29 and replaced with the words "two persons"'"" H, joined by the
Attorney General of Ontario, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal,
which upheld the motion judge's ruling and suspended the declaration of in-
validity for one year in order for the legislature to amend the FLA. "2 H was
subsequently granted leave to appeal the case to the Supreme Court chal-
lenging the definition of "spouse" under section 15 of the Charter and M was
also granted the right to file a cross-appeal. 16
The Court held that section 29 of the Ontario Family Law Act violated
section 15(1) of the Charter.' 7 The remedy, however, was more difficult to
reach than the actual decision of whether a violation had occurred. In previ-
ous cases dealing with section 15(1) Charter challenges by homosexuals, the
court provided one of three remedies. It either held the discriminatory provi-
sions unconstitutional but saved under section 1 of the Charter and therefore
left the statute unchanged,'28 or it found the statute unconstitutional and not
saved by section 1, therefore striking it down.'29 The third remedy was find-
ing the statute under-inclusive in protecting against discrimination of same-
sex couples and therefore "reading into" the statute sexual orientation as a
prohibited ground of discrimination."' The Court in M v. H held that these
three remedies were not appropriate. 3 '
The Court held that the purpose of the spousal support provisions of the
Family Law Act was to provide equitable resolutions for economic disputes
occurring from the dissolution of relationships.'32 The second objective of the
Act was "to alleviate the burden on the public purse by shifting the support
obligation to the other partner" who is financially able to support the other,
as opposed to the province.' These two objectives could not be furthered by
any of the remedies previously employed by the Court. Therefore the Court,
in M v. H, held:
[Tihe remedy of reading in is inappropriate, as it would unduly recast the
legislation, and striking down the FLA as a whole is excessive. Therefore
the appropriate remedy is to declare [section] 29 [of the FLA] of no force
and effect and to suspend the application of the declaration for a period of
six months.'3
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 6.
128. BAKAN, supra note 88.
129. Holland, supra note 82, at 130.
130. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 570.
131. Mv. H, 2S.C.R. at27.
132. Holland, supra note 82, at 138.
133. Id.
134. M v. H, 2 S.C.R. at 27-28.
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With this holding, the Court attempted to deal with discrimination
against same-sex couples in a broader fashion so that the decision would ap-
ply to other sections of the FLA which were not being reviewed by the court
at that time.' The Court suspended the effect of the judgment for six months
in order to allow the Ontario legislature time to amend the Family Law Act
to comply with its holding.36
The legal effect of the decision is far reaching. The Ontario government
did amend the Act, which included 67 statutes.3 , It did not, however, include
same-sex cohabitants in the definition of spouse.'3' Instead, the amendment
added an entire new category entitled "same-sex partners" to all 67 stat-
utes.'39 This amendment effectively produced equal treatment of same-sex
and opposite-sex cohabitants, but it did not erase the distinction between
them and therefore left a negative stigma intact.' The decision, however,
brings same-sex couples under the protections and obligations provided by
the Family Law Act.''
CONCLUSION
Canada has recognized that the courts are not the ideal forums in which
to establish fair and equitable legal rights for homosexuals."' Instead, a leg-
islative response is needed to develop "coherent legal regimes," which con-
sistently and adequately deal with the issues surrounding the rights of same-
sex couples."'3 Canada's "epiphany" is observed in the recent decision of M
v. H. This important case provided long awaited legal recognition to same-
sex relationships and expanded its effect beyond case law regulation by re-
quiring a legislative amendment to the offending provincial statutes.'" M v.
H stops short of legalizing same-sex marriage, but leaves the issue open and
135. Holland, supra note 82, at 139.
136. Id.
137. Id at 140.
The government of Ontario responded begrudgingly to the Supreme Court deci-
sion, with politicians emphasizing that they are only acting because they have been
forced to do so by the Court. This attitude is reflected in the formal name of the
amendment-An Act to Amend Certain Statutes Because of the Supreme Court of
Canada Decision in M v. H (Bill 5).
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amenable to future section 15 challenges." Canada's case law and legisla-
tion place an emphasis on the nature of the relationship that the parties
share.'" It is only from within this framework that legal recognition can be
achieved for same-sex relationships.
Legal recognition of same-sex relationships is exactly what is lacking in
California. Recognition cannot be implied from the vague gender-neutral
language used in Marvin. Vagueness within case law will more likely be
used to reach a holding that agrees with a judge's personal beliefs and values
rather than extend rights to minority groups that are not expressly protected
by the ruling. In fact, one could argue that this was exactly what occurred in
Jones v. Daly."" Legal recognition of same-sex relationships can come in
many different forms, of which granting marital status is only one. Legally
recognizing the homosexual relationship does not equate to sanctioning
same-sex marriage, as most Americans seem to believe. In fact, Canada it-
self has not yet gone that far."8
In order for California, or any other American jurisdiction, to guarantee
equal protection of same-sex couples, there must be legislative action. The
possibility exists that even without the support of the legislature, homosexu-
als might enjoy more equal treatment than they currently do if the judiciary
courageously used express language so the intent of the court could be car-
ried out in a more definitive way. Until this happens, homosexuals will con-
tinue to be oppressed and suffer discrimination on almost every front.
145. One author believes that the case will allow success in future Charter challenges,
and ultimately result in the right for same-sex partners to marry. Bala, supra note 137, at 179.
In the interim, the author suggests that the legislature could constitutionally grant same-sex
couples the right to enter into a relationship called something other than marriage, that confers
rights and obligations that are equivalent to marriage. Id.
146. MEE, supra note 71, at 26.
147. 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981). See discussion supra Part II.A.
148. Bala, supra note 137, at 174.
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